







For the United States and its allies, small wars are a thing of the recent past. The course of Iraq and Afghanistan is not yet known, and their long term consequences are still unclear. But it is not too early to do stocktaking on counterinsurgency, the form of warfare that seeks to defeat an armed challenge to the constitutional order of the state. Should COIN wars be part of the future? Do the makers of strategy even get to choose? Not according to General David Petraeus, the revered architect of the 'surge' strategy in Iraq and the lionised 'saviour general.' In his words, 'Our enemies will typically attack us asymmetrically, avoiding the conventional strengths that we bring to bear. Clearly, the continuation of so-called 'small wars' cannot be discounted. And we should never forget that we don’t always get to choose the wars we fight.'​[1]​ British proponents of COIN take a similar line. Insurgencies are here to stay, they argue.​[2]​ We have little choice, apparently, than to learn and re-learn the doctrine of COIN, that lays down the need to protect civilian populations, out-govern the enemy, kill off violent rejectionists, and win space and time to build up a friendly host state with strong indigenous security forces.  

But like tango, war is still a choice. British strategic minds are so accustomed to COIN, and the paradigm that the homeland can only be secured by ambitious liberal wars abroad, that it has become harder to imagine a future that looks different. The UK has been here before. A century ago, the British army was accustomed to its dominant mission of imperial policing in places like Afghanistan. The presentism and probabalistic assumption that tomorrow's 'most likely' wars resembled operations today overshadowed consideration of graver 'worst case' struggles that looked different.​[3]​ They hardly contemplated the possibility that it would have to switch to major war against states. Mindful that there are no free lunches, skeptics lean towards the opposite pole of 'never again', rejecting COIN as a wrong turn and urging different choices.​[4]​ 

The disagreements between 'coindanistas' and skeptics, therefore, go beyond questions of resource allocation, of capability priorities and even how the military can serve policy goals. At root, the emerging 'histories' and memoirs of the 9/11 wars reflect a deeper division about the question of choice and agency, and whether there are other pathways to security than the ones we have chosen, permanent 'operations' and liberal wars along a bloody frontier. These themes and their history run through the volume's papers. Here I aim to bring those disagreements to the surface. I focus on two aspects of the debate: the question of 'lessons', and the question of discretion. I argue that a fatalistic acceptance of COIN is not the most prudent lesson to draw from recent wars. COIN is not like death and taxes. While worthy of study, it can and should be avoided, and by less hazardous means than turning up early. While the history and agonies of the COIN campaigns should not be discarded in a 'never again' spirit, there should be a stronger presumption against ambitious liberal offensives abroad. A study of 'lessons learned' tactics should not eclipse a sober strategic reassessment. 

Fatal Lessons: The Politics of 'Learning' in Iraq and Afghanistan

To fortify his interpretation of recent wars, General Petraeus appeals to our emotions, arguing that the skills and intellectual understanding of small wars have been 'paid for and written in blood.' COIN as a rediscovered military doctrine was indeed 'hard won.' It emerged in crisis and through a reform movement 'from below' that Petraeus then consolidated and won presidential support for. Petraeus argues that this bounds future policy. We must not turn our backs on COIN, because that would cheapen others' sacrifice. This is a demagogic politics of speaking for the dead. Because of the human costs attached, the process of writing up the histories and drawing 'lessons' from current or recent wars is as political as it is technical. The greater the stakes, the greater the temptation to enlist the recent past in the cause of self-serving interest.​[5]​ 

The shadow of Vietnam and the rejection of COIN wars is not far from these anxieties. America's post-Vietnam generation drew a high level strategic lesson from their experience of that disappointing and divisive struggle. Wars against determined guerrillas in a peripheral theatre, especially when they divert attention from a greater adversary, they judged not worth the trouble. COIN advocates present this as a monumental folly, though the post-Vietnam generation may have been onto something in its reaction against expeditionary adventures into hostile interiors. The place of Vietnam in the debate separates the American debate from the British one, as the UK was spared the distress and division of Vietnam. But in Britain too, there is a drive not to 'squander' what was learned in Helmand and Basra. Some of 'Blair's Generals' argue that West must maintain an army designed to intervene in failing states, lest they allow 'countries like Afghanistan to fester. The world, and our lives, will become more dangerous and gradually our global system will wither.'​[6]​

As militaries compete for scarce resources in the wake of the Great Recession, the issue is more sensitive still. Resources are scarce. Manpower is being scaled down. Increased sabre-rattling from East Asia to the Caucuses suggests the possibility of other kinds of conflicts and confrontations. And tensions across bodies of water in the South and East China seas, or in a melting and resource-rich Arctic, promise to be maritime and air intensive, cutting against the grain of land-centric expeditionary wars. So it is not obvious that states like Britain should choose to place a premium on the patterns of the recent past as a guide to the future. If states and militaries take Petraeus' advice, to preserve and institutionalise the hard-won insights that were gained in the COIN renaissance from 2005 onwards, that will necessarily come at the expense of other missions and other capabilities. There are only so many hours, there is only so much money, and there is no natural continuum from armoured manoeuvres to cultural sensitivity training. 

If there are 'lessons' to be learned, should those lessons focus on how to win small wars? Or should they focus on the strategic wisdom of fighting them at all? Dogged by these issues, there are already emerging several competing accounts of what happened and why in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even the most ardent supporters of those campaigns will admit that the costs and distress of those wars exceeded expectations, that the gains were fragile compared with the investments of blood and treasure. Despite the ambitions to transform both countries through armed nation-building efforts, their future after withdrawal could be dark. After over a decade of hard fighting and painstaking reform efforts, Transparency International judges Afghanistan to be one of the world's three most corrupt nations, in the same league as North Korea.​[7]​ The country remains fractured and ruled by weak kleptocracy whose writ hardly runs beyond Kabul, where power is wielded by a resurgent Taliban, warlords and the Haqqani criminal network. For a time, the symbol of the West's modernising ambitions for Afghanistan were the Kajiki Dam Project, an effort to haul up a giant turbine to provide electricity and bolster the legitimacy of the new order. In the upbeat, euphemistic development-speak of a British army press briefing in 2011, it was part of an attempt by the Provincial Reconstruction Team that 'helps the Afghan government deliver governance and security across the province...Success in Helmand, where the insurgency and drugs trade interact to create particular challenges, is critical to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.'​[8]​ Three years later, the engine lies rusting in the desert. The politics of the war plagued the project, as Chinese engineers fled due to danger. In Helmand, it was hard enough to deliver a turbine, let alone governance. 

It is also unclear what should be taken away from the Phyrric victory of Iraq. The successes that the occupiers did achieve in Iraq do not necessarily point towards a universal template. Skilled counterinsurgency in Iraq coincided and synergistically combined with favourable, context-specific conditions​[9]​, namely the 'Anbar Awakening' and its realignment of Sunni forces against Al Qaeda, facilitated by but not created by international forces. Even in Iraq, there was far more to the challenge than facilitating the creation of a state providing services. It involved the more difficult task of persuading frightened Iraqis to share power when Sunnis and Shiites who were frightened of each other, living in a vacuum of authority opened up in the wake of Saddam's overthrow. Despite these nuances, the gains of the 'surge' lent prestige to COIN doctrine with the suppression of violence. Given the positive result of a new doctrine in Iraq, the temptation was strong to regard Field Manual 3-24 - a book produced with British advice- as the authoritative playbook rather than an approximate, case-specific guide. Yet as Fred Kaplan cautions, 

Counterinsurgency is a technique, not a grand strategy. Field manuals are guides for officers preparing to fight in specific settings, and in that sense, a COIN field manual isn't so different from a field manual for mountain warfare, amphibious operations, or armored combat. If the setting is appropriate and the conditions are favorable, a good field manual can provide a road map for success. But if a mountain is too steep to climb, or a beach is too turbulent to storm, or a field is too cluttered for tanks to maneuver across, then even the best manual won't help much-and it is a commander's responsibility to say so.​[10]​

Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of the model when applied in a more difficult setting.​[11]​ The geopolitics of that tortured country are not hospitable to the ambitious nation-building of the kind attempted in the 2009 'surge', the attempt to use 'COIN' principles turn around America's longest war. Afghanistan lacks a strong seat of government, like Baghdad, from which the state can enforce its writ against warlordism, cronyism and criminal networks. Strong local figures resist the attempt to strengthen Kabul into a dominant capital from which government power radiates. how to balance a perceived need for a strong central authority (implicit within the nationbuilding agenda of stabilisation missions), with the realities that we must accommodate local (district or village) structures of power, rooted in the ever-evolving Qawm groupings. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan inevitably got entangled in the politics of Pakistan, which simultaneously fought and fed the Islamist beast. Its Inter-Service Intelligence Agency provided a critical element that sustains insurgency, external support, in this case a cross-border refuge and patron for sanctuary, cash and weapons. Even the business of supplying the West's war got contaminated by these political problems. Just to operate there, international forces relied upon the logistical supply lines from Karachi through Pakistan. Yet by paying double-dealing security firms to protect transport, this unwittingly injected cash into the insurgency. The objectives of COIN ultimately were hard to realise in Afghanistan not just because it came too late, but because its principles were at odds with the political conditions. This does not necessarily reflect poor execution. The problems militaries encountered in both theatres owed as much to design as to execution, to the choice of war as to the choice of strategy and tactics. In the wildly difficult conditions of that country, a campaign directed by a steering committee of COIN legends Gerald Templer, David Galula and T.E. Lawrence would struggle to succeed. 

At root, Afghanistan and Iraq were liberal wars. In other words, they were attempts to secure the West by creating liberal subjects in the Western image. There is nothing absurd about the notion that other societies can also embrace market democracy. But the liberal wars are more ambitious: they aim to do so at 'our' timetable, in 'our' way, when it suits 'us.' In Afghanistan, and given the six-month time-frame of the typical British tour, this proved wildly optimistic. Those in charge of this 'graduate' level of war continually fell prey to false optimism. Rory Stewart lists the continued promises of imminent decision: 

In 2004, the new International Security Assistance Force commander, General Barno, said that 'without question' 2004 would be a 'decisive year.' General Abizaid thought 2005 would be a 'decisive year', General Richards that 2006 would be the 'crunch year' for the Taliban. Major General Champoux predicted that 2008 would be a 'decisive year.' In 2009, General McChrystal stated: 'The Taliban… no longer has the initiative…We are knee-deep in the decisive year.' Both the Nato secretary-general and the UK foreign secretary, David Miliband, predicted 2010 would be a 'decisive year.' At the end of 2010, President Obama concluded: 'For the first time in years, we've put in place the strategy and the resources.' German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle predicted that 2011 would be a "decisive year."​[12]​ 

The 'short war illusion' also affected British operations. Recall 3 PARA (3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment), with minimal air assets and manpower, had its platoons and companies broken up into vulnerable district centers to conduct a peace support operation in what the government and military advisors expected to be a cleanup operation, unintentionally offered a rich target for Taliban attacks in Helmand in 2006. It was not able to practise counter-insurgency efficiently. It was fighting for its life.​[13]​ This situation flowed from the wishful thinking that the 'liberal war' theology encouraged.  

Discretion: A Matter of Choice

The claim that insurgencies and COIN are inevitably in the West's future loses sight of the nature of war itself. War is a political act and involves choices. To claim that one side 'does not get to choose' is at odds with the verdict of Clausewitz, for whom wars were reciprocal and only truly started once the attacked decided to defend. That is particularly the case for offshore, nuclear-armed states with strong maritime/air forces, and a large intelligence apparatus. It is one thing to counter an insurgency with force when rebels throw down the gauntlet at home, as in Indonesia, Sri Lanka or Russia. It is another and more discretionary thing to venture abroad as an expeditionary force, overthrow regimes, create a new constitutional order and generate violent resistance. Even if the war abroad is triggered by an attack on home soil, there is nothing compulsory about pursuing security via liberal wars. The US and its allies could have used force in other ways to respond to the shock of 9/11. There was no inevitable road from the Twin Towers to Baghdad. 

The incipient 'small wars' debate goes beyond questions of resource allocation, of capability priorities and even how the military can serve policy goals. It goes to the question of discretion. For the counterinsurgency lobby, the catch-cry is one of fatalism: we don't always get to choose our wars, the enemy has a vote, and therefore the US and its allies must choose either to get ready for new ones in the future, or bury their head in the sand. This is an alarming claim. It abandons one of the assets that strong, well-armed offshore states have historically enjoyed, the asset of discretion.     

Some 'coindanistas' regarded their craft in more ambitious terms, as the basis for a struggle against a 'global insurgency.' Despite the costs and grave difficulties that long occupations present, the counterinsurgency lobby concludes that the main lesson is to get ready to fight the next one more efficiently. In the 'midnight' of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, a narrative was already taking shape. Written by practitioners and theorists of COIN and their admirers, it was self-congratulatory. It generated cultish hagiographies that lionised Petraeus as a muscular warrior-scholar, gushed over his love of jogging, uncritically assumed the universal truths of COIN, and paid more attention to the greatness of the man than the problems of the plan.​[14]​ COIN, its believers argued, was the 'graduate level of war.' Because it was complex, the equivalent of eating soup with a knife, it was sophisticated, though wild complexity may also be the symptom of poor strategic choices. This approach treated COIN as more than a technique for particular struggles. It represented the way of the future. Treating 'major war' doctrine and capabilities as relics of industrial interstate conflict, it presented the essence of war as out-governing rather than out-fighting resistance, as 'winning the people', as though other kinds of conflicts do not also entail struggles for consent and the imposing of will. In the words of John Nagl, practitioner and theorist of small wars and fellow of Centre for a New American Security, 'Sept. 11 conclusively demonstrated that instability anywhere can be a real threat to the American people here at home. Defeating instability through effective counterinsurgency operations is therefore a core mission of the Defense Department.' Accordingly, the only effective way to defeat terrorism is to develop soldiers able 'not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies.'​[15]​ 

Military occupations are not, historically, optimum antidotes for addressing instability, either away or at home (as France found in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). Contrary cases such as Malaya or the Philippines exist, but as scholars such as Hew Bennett remind us, even those relatively successful campaigns were long, hard and, on closer inspection, brutal. 'Hearts and minds' in its historical context meant a darker programme than gentle soldering and the rule of law. In reality, campaigns like Malaya and Kenya were not culturally sensitive, except in the sense of leveraging local hatreds. Against the Kikuyu (‘Mau-Mau’) in Kenya, Britain employed interrogation under torture, hangings, indiscriminate bombings of forest, and white settlers or local proxies applied sadistic violence, dismemberment, and killings in custody. In Malaya, there were detentions without trial, executions, jungle bombing campaigns, and forcible resettlement of the population into camps. Divide-and-rule exemplary punishment marked these campaigns.​[16]​ Ironically, it is American authorities on COIN who revive the romanticised historical model of kinder, gentler British wars waged during the twilight of empire. British military history has ‘long been a stick with which American officers are prone to thrash one another.’​[17]​

Does COIN even 'work' as an affordable antidote to menaces such as transnational terrorism? Judging by the central claim of the War on Terror, that the UK can only be secure by fixing broken states, the answer is not cheering. In the long haul, interventions have a poor record. They tend to lengthen rather than shorten civil wars, make them more bloody rather than less,​[18]​ and rarely promote stable democratic evolution.​[19]​ Except in atypically favourable conditions, wars followed up by rebuilding missions are costly, likely to fall short of their ambitions and in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, divert resources from other important tasks.​[20]​ There are other measures short of ill-conceived coin campaigns that can disrupt violent threats against the United States from afar. Effective internationally-coordinated police work, judicious raiding, intelligence sharing, strengthened airport security and measures to split militant groups have a better and more affordable record at containing threats. An alerted homeland with fortified defences can do much to curtail the deadliness of violent challengers, and it can do much to secure the global commons that lie between its heartland and the political interiors of 'failed states', whose significance as a staging post and incubator of threats is overstated to begin with. While it may be that some states afflicted by acute problems of governance are prone to terrorist attacks and may be more likely to have transnational terrorists within them, they are usually not reliable hosts for plotting complex large scale attacks abroad.​[21]​ 
  
There is a darker implication to the embrace of COIN as the go-to model for combating extremism. If security relies on 'Defeating instability', and 'anywhere', then Nagl and his fellow small wars advocates offer a doctrine of permanent revolution and continual war. Those who argue for this way to security share the premise that Western security is tied to the political interior of weak states, and that threats somewhere are threats everywhere. 'Counterinsurgency' may appeal as a gentler and kinder style of security-seeking, with its doctrine of securing populations and winning their support through 'clear, hold and build.' But it still takes troops on the ground to clear and hold ground before rebuilding can be done. This process is bloody and meets resistance. COIN is not a soft alternative to Realpolitik, but an act of coercive modernisation to make friends and foes feel the smack of government. Its architects preach 'heroic restraint' and discriminate applications of minimal force. But in the eye of resistance, practitioners of COIN can radically ratchet up what they judge to be 'minimal' force. Hence the speed with which British and American forces under the generalship of Petraeus in Afghanistan could switch to killing Taliban through ramped-up special forces raids by Joint Special Operations Command, what John Nagl described as an 'almost industrial-scale counterterrorism killing machine.”​[22]​ 

To anticipate an objection, it could be argued that in neither Iraq & Afghanistan did the invading countries expect to be fighting a counterinsurgency war years after 'major combat operations' ended, so the asymmetric struggle was foisted on the occupier. While it is true that the occupiers did not expect long COIN struggles, that says more about the assumptions of the invaders than about the scope of choice in the future. To assume, as the planners did, that invasion would not lead to determined resistance and internal civil conflict was foolish. To reckon, as the planners did, that any resistance would be conveniently presented on an open battlefield rather than taking the form of 'asymmetric' methods, was also foolish. Experts on the regions warned in private briefings that resistance and post-invasion chaos was a serious possibility. But the state politely ignored those warnings.​[23]​ The refusal to acknowledge the possibility of irregular armed resistance reflected the triumphalism of the trans-Atlantic liberal ideology that reigned at the time. Thanks to the confident assumptions of Washington's 'unipolar moment', the chief policymakers proceeded on the expectation that Iraqis and Afghans were really only a 'regime change' away from becoming committed democratic capitalists. Bush and Blair championed the cause of democracy but underestimated the force of nationalism, prized free elections and free markets for populations whose immediate fears were more visceral.  

As Robert Johnson shows in his contribution, the wider counterinsurgency lobby from goes further still. As well as getting ready for a future that has COIN in it, they propose that next time, the West must step in earlier, 'upstream' and in a preventative capacity, to forestall the 'next' Afghanistan, Somalia or Mali. From this perspective, the issue is not so much a matter of principles but a matter of dates. 
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